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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to seek to understand the differences in image repair
strategies adopted by two governments that operate in the Western and Asian societies when faced
with similar crises.
Design/methodology/approach – Textual analyses are presented of communication of Hurricane
Katrina and Typhoon Morakot by the Taiwanese and US governments, respectively.
Findings – Faced with similar accusations of slow response, the Asian culture, represented by
the Taiwanese Government, used predominantly mortification and corrective action strategies. The
Western culture, represented by the US Government, used predominantly bolstering and defeasibility
and a mixed bag of other strategies such as shifting the blame and attack the accuser.
Research limitations/implications – A limitation of the study is that it depends on news reports,
instead of news releases and speeches, for analysis. However, given the rapidity and volatility in the
unfolding drama of each of the two crises, many of the comments made were to the media and not in
prepared speeches. It is a limitation the authors accept.
Practical implications – Strategies reflected Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance and power distance
dimensions. These dimensions should be considered when designing communication strategies in
different cultures so as to be culturally sensitive and relevant.
Originality/value – Few, if any, studies on image repair theory have addressed the role of culture in
strategies used. This study fills the gap by integrating Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory.
KeywordsCase studies, Communication management, Crisis management, Cross-cultural management,
National cultures, Rhetoric, Disaster management, Government policy, United States of America, Taiwan
Paper type General review
Introduction
A veteran practitioner once said:
A good image – one that’s well made and well cared for is something that stands the test
of time, it is something that can survive everything – scandal, change, bad earnings
(Lerbinger, 1997, p. 100).
An organization’s image and reputation are assets that are built up over a long period
of time (Benoit and Pang, 2008). Individuals and organizations go to great lengths to
protect and maintain positive images in the minds of their publics.
On a larger scale, the image of a government can be threatened by crises that they
do not handle well, and this impacts the trust it has with its citizens as well as its
standing internationally (Cai et al., 2009). Fairbanks et al. (2005) argued that trust
is eroded when citizens feel they are not informed of government actions, especially
in times of crises when it is imperative to respond to the threat in the socio-political
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system and where promptness is required of governments to engage its citizens
(Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1997). Communication can help restore some level of trust,
argued Longstaff and Yang (2008).
Two recent crises, representing two different cultures, are instructive on how
governments can communicate with its citizens. Conceivably, they may not be similar
nor is there a prescriptive model of communication (Dardis and Haigh, 2009), but
these crises offer a view of how sensitivity to culture can play a critical role in
communicating crises. On one end of the spectrum is the Asian culture, represented by
Taiwan. On 8 August 2009, Typhoon Morakot hit Taiwan, resulting in the worst flood
the country experienced in 50 years. The island’s southern areas, Kaoshiung, Pingtung,
Hualian, Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan, Taitung, Miaoli and Taichung were pounded by fierce
winds and heavy rainfall. Pingtung and Kaoshiung counties experienced the
equivalent of a year’s rainfall in two days. Worst hit was Xiaolin Village in Kaoshiung
where 500 villagers were buried alive by the mudslides. The heavy rains flooded the
rivers and created mudslides that caused widespread damage. Roads, railway tracks,
and bridges were washed away. The Council of Agriculture estimated that the country
suffered NT$7.26 billion (US$220 million) in agricultural losses. After the storm, close
to 850,000 households had no water supply and more than 110,000 households were
without electricity for days. Tourist attractions such as the Maolin National Scenic
Area and its tourist centre in Liukuei, Kaoshiung, Hongyeh Hot Spring Zone were
completely destroyed. The Taiwanese Tourism Bureau estimated that damage
to scenic areas topped NT$570 million (US$18.7 million). On the other side of
the spectrum is the Western culture, represented by the USA. In 2005, Hurricane
Katrina struck the American Gulf Coast in what was termed by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration as “the most destructive storm ever to strike the
United States” (Parker and Levin, 2005, p. 1A). A category four hurricane, Katrina
caused extensive damage to the USA in terms of the number of deaths, displacement
and economic loss caused. The hurricane showed up the lack of crisis preparedness of
the Federal Government. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was widely
criticised for their lack of planning and were accused of directing funds from disaster
management to fighting terrorism.
Despite the differences in culture, the two crises shared several similarities.
There were massive death and destruction in both crises; and they shattered the
people’s confidence in their respective governments’ ability to handle the crisis. The
accusations made against both governments were also similar. Both governments
were accused of:
. being slow in their response and were not prepared for the crisis; and
. showing lack of empathy and compassion for the victims.
Crisis type, in this case, natural disaster, serves as a frame that defines how people
interpret crisis responsibility (Coombs, 2006). Even though the loci of control for both
these disasters were external, the culpability for mismanagement of the disaster was
evident. Another similarity was the massive efforts undertaken by both governments to
repair their image subsequently. Given the similar conditions these two governments
faced, it presented a unique opportunity to study the image repair strategies used by
both governments, identify similarities and differences in the use of strategies,
and examine the influence of culture on the choice of strategies.
Image repair
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Many studies have been conducted to analyse how organizations (Benoit and
Brinson, 1994; Benoit and Czerwinski, 1997; Benoit and Pang, 2008; Cowden and
Sellnow, 2002); prominent individuals (Benoit, 1997; Benoit and Brinson, 1999),
and politicians (Benoit, 2004), repaired their images. Few have examined image repair
strategies employed by nations and governments (Cai et al., 2009; Zhang and Benoit,
2004) and in a non-Western setting (Meng, 2010). This study is significant as it fills the
gap by examining image repair strategies used by governments in both a Western and
an Asian setting but also compare the differences in image repair strategies used.
More importantly, while studies have extended to examine perceptions of corporate
social responsibility, relationships and source credibility in image repair (Haigh and
Brubaker, 2010), this is arguably the first study examining the influence of culture on the
use of image repair strategies, through the lens of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory.
This study thus aims to fill the cultural gap by applying Hofstede’s theory to understand
reactions to image repair strategies in Western and Asian countries. With the USA
representing the Western culture and Taiwan representing the Asian culture, it is hoped
that this study can inform practitioners the skill sets required to function in the global
marketplace, where different cultures often converge. It is hoped that practitioners can
benefit from the findings to begin to learn how to be more culturally attuned.
Literature review
Image repair theory
Research in crisis communication focussing on shaping organizational strategies
in response to a crisis has relied on the image repair and the situational crisis
communication theories for analyses. The former focuses on texts (Benoit, 2004), while
the latter extends to contexts, like the organization’s crisis history and relationship
history (Coombs, 2008a, b). While these are important, for the purposes of this study,
the context and characteristics we would examine are:
. Crisis type. Similar, both natural disasters.
. Locus of control. Similar, both external.
. Nature of accusations. Similar, both governments were accused of slow in
response and displayed lack of empathy and compassion to victims. Benoit (2004)
described this as the offensive act.
. Attributions of crisis responsibility. even though it is supposed to be low, based on
the situational crisis communication theory (Coombs, 2008a, b), it became high
over time because of poor management of the crises. Benoit (2004) described this
as the accused being held responsible for the act.
Our aim was to keep these variables consistent and constant between the two cases
while exploring the role of culture. In that regard, we have followed closely the ethos of
research using image repair theory, which examines, first, what is the nature of the
crisis (or what Benoit (2004) called, what is the offensive act); and is the accused held
responsible for the act (Benoit, 2004). This study thus uses the image repair theory,
described as the “dominant paradigm for examining corporate communication in times
of crises” (Dardis and Haigh, 2009, p. 101), as its theoretical lens.
The image repair theory, which is an extension of apologia (Coombs et al., 2010),
asserts that an organization’s credibility depends on its image to a very large extent.
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Image plays a crucial role in building and maintaining international relations
(Zhang and Benoit, 2004). Threats to this image often necessitate massive efforts to
repair it (Benoit and Brinson, 1999). While previous studies have shed light on how
politicians, organizations and celebrities engaged in restoration discourses (Benoit and
Brinson, 1999), the question remains, what strategies can governments use when
accused of being irresponsible and ineffective?
Benoit’s image repair theory can be applied to analyse communication strategies
nations use to repair its image during a crisis. It is divided into five major typologies
(Benoit and Pang, 2008).
Denial. Denial has two variants: simple denial or shifting the blame to another party.
The purpose of the latter strategy is to position the accuser as victim.
Evasion of responsibility. The second major typology is evasion of responsibility.
The first variant is provocation, where a nation reacts by responding it was egged on
to do so. The second is defeasibility, when a nation argues its case on the basis of lack
of information and control. The third is accident, where the “accused” states that the
accident happened unintentionally. Last is good intention, where a nation argues that
the offensive act was done with good intentions.
Reducing offensiveness. The third major typology is reducing offensiveness. One
can do so by bolstering, which seeks to highlight one’s positive traits. Minimization
strategies can also be used to reduce the severity of the situation. Differentiation
strategies seek to reduce offensiveness by suggesting that the act was less offensive
than perceived. Transcendence strategies seek to place the situation at a higher level,
with more important concerns. Attacking the accuser seeks to reduce the credibility of
the accusations. Compensation strategy is where those responsible decide to offer
something of value to the victims.
Corrective action. The fourth typology is corrective action, which aims to reassure
stakeholders that such crisis situations would not reoccur.
Mortification. The final typology is mortification, when one admits its mistake and
seeks forgiveness.
The role of culture
In an attempt to understand various cultural orientations, Hall (1976) introduced the
concept of high versus low context. According to him, the concept of cultural orientation
appears on a continuum on which countries may be placed to study the extent to which
“contexting” occurs in various cultures, with the high and the low contexts occupying
the two extreme ends of the continuum. On the high end of the continuum are countries
like Japan, China and Korea and towards the lower end of the continuum are countries
like Switzerland, Norway and Sweden. France, Africa, Spain and the Middle Eastern
Arab countries are placed in the middle of the continuum.
A high context culture is where members of the society are deeply involved with one
another, forming intimate relationships. Existence of social hierarchies, use of simple
meanings to disseminate information and individual self-control are indicators of this
culture. On the contrary, members in a low context culture are highly individualized,
alienated and less involved with the other members of the society. Less social
hierarchies and limited communication characterize this culture. Hall (1976) suggested
that social structures and hierarchies had a significant impact on determining whether
a culture belongs to the high or low context.
Image repair
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Building on this, Geert Hofstede identified five basic dimensions of
culture: masculinity-femininity, individualism-collectivism, long-term orientation,
power distance, and uncertainty avoidance. According to Hofstede (2009),
masculinity versus femininity refers to the roles both genders play in society while
individualism-collectivism refers to the degree to which individuals are segregated into
groups in society. A collectivist society is characterized by strong groups, extended
family members which continue to support each other while an individualist society is
characterized by loose ties where members of the society are expected to look after
themselves and their immediate family members. The new dimension of long-term
orientation was added following a study conducted in 23 countries based on a
questionnaire designed by Chinese scholars. According to Hofstede (2009), long-term
orientation is characterized by values of thrift and perseverance while those associated
with short-term orientation include respect for tradition, protecting one’s face and
fulfilling social obligations. The power distance index (PDI) measures the extent
to which less powerful members accept the unequal distribution of power in society.
For instance, high power distance nations encompass a latent conflict between
individuals and organizations that have prestige and resources and those who feel
powerless. While the powerless accept their position in society, they are not very
forgiving when the powerful makes mistakes (Taylor, 2000). Asian cultures typically
have higher PDIs compared to the Western cultures. The uncertainty avoidance index
(UAI) indicates the extent to which a culture programs its members to feel comfortable
in unstructured situations (Frith and Mueller, 2003). UAI also provides information
about societal tolerance for inequality.
The cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede were not without limitations.
Questions were raised about its methodological rigor (McSweeney, 2002; Westwood
and Everett, 1987); his failure to demonstrate a causal link between his dimensions of a
particular national culture and a specific national action (McSweeney, 2002); his failure
to consider the impact politics and power may have upon the national culture
(Westwood and Everett, 1987); and the assumption of equating national culture with
national uniformity (Westwood and Everett, 1987; McSweeney, 2002).
Despite the criticisms, it is without doubt that Hofstede’s dimensions broke new
ground. It is unprecedented in scope and it remains unsurpassed to this day (Draguns,
2007). Since the publication of Hofstede’s work, even though many studies have been
conducted on national cultures, Draguns (2007) noted that Hofstede’s original
monumental multinational study has not been replicated in its entirety. By the end of
1999, the first edition of Culture’s Consequences had been cited in 1,800 publications in
several disciplines.
Hofstede’s four major cultural value dimensions of power distance, uncertainty
avoidance, masculinity-femininity, and collectivism-individualism has received
considerable support from other researchers (Dorfman and Howell, 1988; James,
1993; Smith and Bond, 1993). Taylor (2000) posited that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions
is one of the most popular and best treatments of culture and business communication.
It is also rigorous (Erez and Earley, 1993).
Hofstede’s model has been found to be useful for describing intercultural
communication (Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey, 1988) and crisis situations
(Soeters, 1996; Taylor, 2000). In this study, we argue that even with its limitations,
Hofstede’s framework provides a useful starting point for an exploratory study to
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examine how culture impact crisis strategies. Of the five dimensions, uncertainty
avoidance and the power distance dimensions have been found to be most applicable
for studying the crisis management efforts of an organization. Coombs (2008a, b, p.
1058) argued that:
Maureen Taylor (2000) is right in arguing for the need to apply intercultural concepts such as
those of Hofstede to crisis communication. Cultural variables such as ambiguity tolerance
and power distance must be factored into the socio-psychological tradition research to permit
an international application of the findings.
Uncertainty avoidance examines how humans cope with ambiguity and power distance
examines how members of a community deal with inequality and conflict (Taylor,
2000). Thus, we apply the dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and power distance to
our study.
Based on the literature, this study examines:
RQ1. What are the image repair strategies used by a government that represents
the Asian culture, in this case, Taiwan in Typhoon Morakot?
RQ2. What are the image repair strategies adopted by a government that represents
the Western culture, in this case, the USA in Hurricane Katrina?
RQ3. What are the differences in the strategies adopted and what role does culture
play in the strategies used?
RQ4. What can practitioners learn about the role of culture in an international
setting?
Method
This study employs textual analysis of news reports, which has been the prevalent and
primary method of analysis in image repair studies (Benoit, 2000). This qualitative
method allows the researcher to make an educated guess of the likely interpretation
of the text (Garyantes, 2006) when questions about the social impact of the message
are asked (Wimmer and Dominick, 2006). The texts were analysed based on the
categorizations of image repair strategies. Durham (2005) argued that the selection,
emphasis and exclusion of texts enable the researcher to grapple with the complexity,
nuances, and contradictions of media artifacts.
Even though the strategies used in the two crises were studied for intrinsic value,
more importantly, their instrumental values were more critical in shedding insights on
how different cultures communicate in crisis, which is the larger purpose of this study.
In instrumental studies, Stake (1998, p. 88) argued that the cases are examined to
provide “insight into an issue” whereas intrinsic studies are cases analysed in detail.
Thus, the intrinsic values of the cases must illuminate the instrumental purpose.
Data collection
News articles. Benoit (2000) argued that news reports are a viable way of analysing a
crisis. As the full texts of the speeches made, especially those made by the Taiwanese
Government were not readily available; or if they were, they were in other languages
(namely, Mandarin and Hokkien, a dialect) which when translated may lose some of its
nuances; the researchers decided to analyse news articles published by the English
Image repair
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national dailies of the two countries as the primary texts of analysis to eliminate
interpretation errors resulting from translations.
In image repair studies, news stories have often been used as primary texts of
analyses (Cai et al., 2009; Drumheller and Benoit, 2004; Liu, 2007; Zhang and Benoit,
2004). In all of these studies, the researcher ’s intentions were not to study the role of the
mass media in a crisis. Instead, media texts were used as tools or data sources to
understand how a crisis was communicated by the governments. Carey (2003, p. 6), in
analysing the uses of media in reporting the 9/11 crisis, had described media reportage
of the crisis as “robust”. In examining whether there was any difference between what
was transmitted through the media channels compared directly to by the organization
through its own channels like the web site, Coombs and Holladay (2009) found little
meaningful difference between the print and video delivery. They argued that
organizations should continue to deliver their messages through the media. Based on
this argument, we can argue that media texts remain a viable tool to capture the
messages delivered by organizations.
Additionally, even though there might be some elements of bias and subjectivity in
some of these news reports, we believe that prestige newspapers, as argued by
Krippendorff (2004) and Riffe et al. (1998), would project a fair representation of what
had happened. Noll (2003, p. xviii) argued that media content may be studied to “verify
assumptions of content”. In our verification of content, we had examined beyond media
framing to distilling to its fundamental forms the key messages communicated with
the primary goal of understanding strategies, not to prove or disprove media biases.
News articles that contained words spoken by Taiwanese President Ma Yingjeou,
US President George Bush and key members of their administrations were analysed to
extract the accusations made against them, as well as what was said, in direct response
to those accusations. All the statements analysed were primary statements made by
the respective officials and not gleaned through second or third person accounts. For
this study, only prestige, national dailies were selected for analyses. Goh and Hao
(2000) argued that broadsheet papers were found to cover stories in a less sensational
fashion than the “tabloid” newspapers. Riffe et al. (1998, p. 86) argued that prestige
newspapers are valid instrument for analysis because they play a “key role in history”.
For Taiwan, Taipei Times was selected for analysis. It is the mainstream
English-language daily in Taiwan and one of the top three newspapers with a daily
circulation of 285,130. Its credibility has been recognized with awards from the USA,
Canada, and the UK. The Guardian, a major English newspaper in the UK, listed Taipei
Times as a “quality, English-language daily [with] thorough reporting and considered
editorial judgment” (The Guardian, World News Guide, n.d., www.Guardian.co.uk). For
Typhoon Morakot, 187 stories published between 9 and 29 August 2009 were obtained
from Factiva, using the search term “Morakot”. Out of the 187 stories, only 22 stories that
reflected the use of image repair strategies to address the accusations were analysed.
For the USA, the newspaper selected for analysing Hurricane Katrina was
The New York Times, the newspaper of record (Gitlin, 1980). Using search terms
“Hurricane Katrina” and “Bush Administration” or “US Government”, news articles
published between 20 August 2005 and 18 September 2005 were studied. Out of the
92 articles generated on the LexisNexis database, 20 stories that contain the accusations
directed against the government and the ones that reflected the use of image repair
strategies were used. Opinion editorials are excluded from this study.
CCIJ
16,3
224
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 S
in
ga
po
re
 M
an
ag
em
en
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 2
2:
19
 2
3 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
19
 (P
T)
Data analysis
The data analysis was carried out in three stages. The first stage was identifying the
key issues and how the crises developed. Issues form the researchers’ theme (Stake,
1998). The key issues were identified through a careful examination of news articles.
The stories were read to understand the general issues present.
Once the issues were identified, the second stage involved delineating the time
frame to examine how each of the issues developed over time. The reports were further
analysed based on the occurrence of each type of image repair strategy used. The
prominence and development of the use of particular strategies were plotted against
the date to identify patterns in the strategies used and the intensity of image repair
efforts. Each crisis was also divided into three phases, each phase indicating a change
in the crisis management efforts by the government bodies. For both crises, what was
evident that both share similar characteristics in the way the governments responded
to the crises: in phase 1, it was inertia; in phase 2, it was reactive communication; and in
phase 3, it was characterized by proactive communication.
The third stage was examination of the strategies. This systematic process of
evaluating and illuminating persuasive messages was informed by definitions in the
image repair theory. Zhang and Benoit (2004, p. 163) argued this examination of the
relationship of context and the message allows the researcher to make a:
[. . .] judgment of the importance of the elements of the message as a gestalt that considers
not only simple frequency but also prominence as indicated by placement, development,
and relationship of ideas in the persuasive messages.
Throughout the three stages, close attention was paid to patterns of consistency and
contradictions. This would ensure what Plowman et al. (1995) described as systematic
analysis of data.
Findings and discussion
RQ1 examined what were the image repair strategies used by a government that
represents the Asian culture, in this case, Taiwan in Typhoon Morakot? As discussed, this
can be examined through three phases. As the cases are thus studied for the instrumental
value of larger purpose of understanding how different cultures communicate
in crisis while not ignoring the intrinsic value, the strategies used are described in
snapshots.
Phase 1 – inertia (9-15 August 2009)
The Ma administration predominantly used shifting the blame and simple denial as
two variants of the same strategy. Bolstering and minimization were used once but not
repeated.
Shift the blame. From the onset of the disaster, the Ma administration shifted the
entire blame of the death toll to the villagers themselves. President Ma reportedly said,
“When the residents do not see [flash floods] with their own eyes, they are not alert”
and “some people did not feel comfortable evacuating”. President Ma also accused the
weather bureau for releasing inaccurate forecasts (Loa et al., 2009).
Denial. Premier Liu Chao-Shiuan, however, took a different approach by denying
the accusation of being slow to respond to the crisis. He said that the “reaction this time
was faster than after the 921 earthquake” (Wang et al., 2009). The 921 earthquake
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occurred on 21 September 1999 in Jiji, Nantou County. Measuring 7.3, it killed more
than 2,400 people were killed and injured over 11,000. It was the second-deadliest
quake in recorded history in Taiwan, after the 1935 Hsinchu-Taichung earthquake
(http://eng.taiwan.net.tw/pda/m1.aspx?sNo¼0002111&id¼A12-00013).
Bolstering. Bolstering was also used when Premier Liu announced to the survivors,
“I am here today to understand your problems” (Hsu and Ko, 2009).
Evidently, defensive strategies, or what Pang (2006) characterized as advocacy
strategies aimed at defending one’s position, were evident in this phase.
Phase 2 – reactive communication (16-22 August 2009)
The second phase of the crisis was marked by a spike in the intensity of image repair
efforts. As many as six image repair strategies were used simultaneously in their
attempt to contain the damage.
Mortification and corrective action. The Ma government started a mortification
campaign here. Mortification and corrective action were the predominant strategies
and were consistently reflected in media reports throughout the second stage of the
crisis. Ma apologized for being slow in the rescue efforts (Mo, 2009), and during a visit
to Neipu Township, Ma also apologized to the victims for coming too late (Ko, 2009c)
and “for any shortcomings” (Ko and Lu, 2009). At an orphanage, he apologized again
for “coming too late” (Ko, 2009b). Ma (2009) said that “the government would ask local
governments to conduct disaster prevention drills before flood season and evacuate
residents living in dangerous areas”. The government would also map out a standard
operating procedure (Ko and Lu, 2009). On the lack of compassion and empathy to the
victims, Ma “apologized for the ‘improper’ remarks he made” (Ko and Lu, 2009) and
apologized to a family which was still missing a family member (Ko, 2009a).
Shift the blame. Even as it engaged in mortification, the Ma administration continued
to shift the blame to the local government. In a report, Ma said, “So many problems
would be solved if residents could be evacuated in time before floods or mudslides
occur” (Mo, 2009). He said this again in a weekly video chat that was reported in the
papers, saying that “if people could have been evacuated earlier, so many problems
could have been solved” (Loa and Shan, 2009a, b).
Ma also blamed the local governments for their mentality of not taking typhoon
drills seriously (Ko, 2009d). When accused of not being concerned enough to visit the
victims, the Presidential Office spokesperson deflected the criticism by explaining
that “the President had delayed visiting the disaster area to avoid interfering with the
rescue effort” (Mo and Shih, 2009).
Denial. While the President apologized and conceded relief efforts could have been
faster, Taiwan’s Premier Liu Chao-shiuan undermined the President’s image repair efforts
by saying that the government was “prompt in rescuing people” stranded by mudslides
and floods (Ko, 2009a). Minister of National Defense Chen Chao-Ming also “dismissed
criticism that the military reacted too slowly” (Ko, 2009a, b, c, d, e; Ko and Lu, 2009).
Other strategies. Defeasibility was used when Ma was asked if more could have been
done to learn from previous crises. He quoted as saying that “disasters get increasingly
serious each time, making some experience useless” (Mo, 2009). Compensation was
another strategy used during this phase. The Ma administration offered compensating
the surviving flood victims by helping to “cover their rent and basic living expenses
because they may not be able to make a living on their own for some time” (Wang, 2009a).
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Evidently, the strategies used can be described as more accommodative strategies
(Pang, 2006) aimed at winning over one’s audience. However, remnants of advocacy
remains, particularly when criticisms were raised about what the government could
have done.
Phase 3 – proactive communication (23-29 August 2009)
The predominant strategy is mortification and the Ma government continued a weak
attempt to deny the accusations made against them, employing denial and corrective
action strategies, as well as mortification.
Mortification and corrective action. Ma personally visited the family of one of the
victims to apologize for the “improper” remarks he made when they asked him for help
to look for their missing father (Ko, 2009c). On 12 August, the visibly distraught pair
had complained to Ma that his bodyguards had tried to stop them from telling him
about their father, who was missing after the flooding. Ma responded by saying,
“I didn’t know you were looking for me” and “I have come, haven’t I?” (Wang, 2009b).
He continued to lead a team of officials in a “deep bow” to apologize for being late
in getting to the villages affected by the disaster (Ko, 2009c). After his apology,
Ma announced corrective action would be undertaken to relax what is perceived as
bureaucratic relief regulations. Applications for compensation would be simplified for
typhoon victims.
Denial. In one of the villages, Ma said that criticisms about the slow response to the
disaster were “unfair” and that the military risked their lives to rescue people from the
onset of the disaster (Ko, 2009e).
Evidently, similar to phase 2, the strategies used can be described as more
accommodative strategies (Pang, 2006) aimed at winning over one’s audience. Again,
remnants of advocacy remains, particularly when criticisms were raised about what
the government could have done.
The RQ2 examined what were the image repair strategies adopted by a government
that represents the Western culture, in this case, the USA in Hurricane Katrina? Similar
to the RQ1, this too can be examined through three phases.
Phase 1 – inertia (29 August-4 September 2005)
The first phase of the crisis was characterized by much criticism levelled by state and
local authorities and politicians, from the Louisiana governor Kathleen B. Blanco to
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin, at the US Federal Government for its inefficiency in
preparing for the crisis and for their slow response to the disaster. At one point, the
criticism even took on a racial slur. Rap star Kanye West, who claimed he echoed the
views of the African American, said the government’s response would be been faster if
the majority of the victims affected had been whites. “George Bush doesn’t care about
black people” was his famous refrain (Bumiller, 2005b).
After the initial inertia, the Bush Administration undertook massive efforts to reduce
the damage. Thousands of National Guards and security troops were deployed by the
administration to help with the relief operations. Search and security teams along with
more aid including food, water and temporary shelter were also promised to the victims.
The President issued orders to deploy around over 10,000 Army and Air National Guard
personnel in Mississippi and Louisiana and the Pentagon dispatched around
60 helicopters to assist in the search and rescue operations (Stevenson, 2005).
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However, what was remembered about the federal government’s strategies were as
follows.
Defeasibility. While responding to accusations made against the US Government for
their slow response to the victims and that many victims took refuge at the convention
centre, Federal Emergency Management Agency Director, Michael D. Brown stated,
“The federal government did not know about the people in the convention centre until
today” (The New York Times, 2005).
Bolstering. When asked if the USA should respond to offers of assistance by
international allies, US President Bush said that the USA could fend for itself. He added,
“I do expect a lot of sympathy and perhaps some will send cash dollars, but this
country is going to rise up and take care of it” (Forero and Weisman, 2005).
Evidently, defensive strategies, or what Pang (2006) characterized as advocacy
strategies aimed at defending one’s position, were evident in this phase.
Phase 2 – reactive communication (5-11 September 2005)
The second phase of the crisis was characterized by an increase in the intensity of the
image repair strategies adopted by the US Government. Up to six strategies were
employed during this period.
Corrective action. Besides bringing in over 7,000 National Guard troops into
New Orleans, the president also promised relief in the form of food and other supplies
for the hurricane victims (McFadden, 2005). The Bush Administration also removed
the head of its Federal Emergency Management Agency, Michael D. Brown, for “poor
performance” post-Katrina (Stevenson and Kornblut, 2005).
Bolstering. A weekend after the hurricane struck New Orleans, news channels and
television programs began displaying images of helicopter rescues, troops assisting
the rescue operations (Stanley, 2005). The President visited the Red Cross headquarters
in Washington to personally thank the volunteers to publicly display his concern
(Stanley, 2005). At an event held in the White House, President Bush stated, “In these
difficult days, we have again seen the great strength and character and resolve of
America; we will continue to work to help the people who are struggling” (Stevenson
and Kornblut, 2005).
US President Bush, along with former President Bill Clinton, also appeared at the
shelter in Houston to announce the creation of the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund in an
effort to aid the hurricane victims (Nagourney and Broder, 2005). The President also
stated that the Department of Education was working on a plan to provide donations to
schools enrolling displaced students (Dillon, 2005). The administration also initiated
a number of regulations, such as, larger tax deductions for organizations participating
in charitable work and tax credits for investment companies pursuing community
development projects (Andrews, 2005). Job placement services were also being offered
for the evacuees along with medical care, cash assistance and insurance benefits
(Andrews, 2005).
Denial. Responding to some of the remarks that the administration did not care
about the victims, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, “How can that be the case?
Nobody, especially the President, would have left people unattended on the basis of
race” (Broder, 2005).
Attack the accuser. White House Spokesperson Scott McClellan attacked the
accusers when he used the phrase, blame game, to describe the criticisms directed
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against the administration. White House Speaker, Representative J. Dennis Hastert
defended the Bush Administration saying, “Some people are really very anxious to
start pointing fingers and playing the blame game. I think we need to get our work
done” (Nagourney and Hulse, 2005).
Defeasibility. As questions regarding the ineffectiveness in responding to the crisis
emerged, some federal officials admitted uncertainty over who was in charge, which had
contributed to some of the delay in providing aid (Shane et al., 2005). Homeland Security
Secretary, Michael Chertoff stated, “The local government’s capacity to respond to the
disaster was severely compromised by the hurricane and flood” (Shane et al., 2005).
Members of the Federal Government stated that owing to the state’s emergency
communications system either being knocked or overloaded, the officials were unable to
fully identify the extent of the damage in Louisiana and thereby, provide adequate help
to the state. Some of the delay caused was also attributed to miscommunication.
A spokesman for the DHS said, “There was a significant amount of discussions between
the parties and likely some confusion about what was requested and what was needed”
(Lipton et al., 2005b).
Mortification. Senior officials admitted that the hurricane revealed certain critical
flaws in the national disaster response plan, especially with regards to its failure to
recognize the role of the local police, fire and medical professionals (Lipton et al.,
2005a, b). Responding to the accusations made against the federal government
following their response to the disaster, the Press Secretary at the DHS said, “I don’t
believe there is one critical error, but some missteps that were made by everyone
involved” (Lipton et al., 2005a, b).
Evidently, the strategies used shifted from advocacy to more accommodative
strategies aimed at responding to long-standing criticisms while acknowledging that
more could have been done.
Phase 3 – proactive communication (12-18 September 2005)
Bolstering. President Bush acknowledged the magnitude of the disaster by saying,
“Protecting a city that sits lower than the water around it is not easy, but it has and will
be done” (Bumiller, 2005a). On his third visit to New Orleans following the hurricane,
President Bush attempted to reassure the public about his administration’s commitment
to rebuild the area of New Orleans ( Johnson et al., 2005). The President, while speaking
in Jackson Square, stated:
Tonight I offer this pledge to the American people: Throughout the area hit by the hurricane,
we will do what it takes, we will stay as long as it takes to help citizens rebuild their
communities and their lives (Bumiller, 2005b).
Responding to the accusations of racism directed against his administration, President
Bush stated:
As all of us saw on television, there is also some deep, persistent poverty in this region as
well. And that poverty has roots in a history of racial discrimination, which cut off
generations from the opportunity of America. We have a duty to confront this poverty with
bold action. So let us restore all that we have cherished from yesterday, and let us rise above
the legacy of inequality.
He added, “That is our vision of the future, in this city and beyond: We will not just
rebuild, we will build higher and better” (Bumiller, 2005b).
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Attack the accuser. Another strategy employed was attacking the accuser; in this
case, government critics like rapper Kanye West and Chairman of the Democratic
National, Howard Dean. On being asked about the comments made by the rapper
Kanye West, Laura Bush, the first lady, said, “I think all of those remarks were
disgusting, to be perfectly frank, of course President Bush cares about everyone in our
country” (Bumiller, 2005b).
Corrective action. Responding to a federal government assessment of his
administration’s response to the hurricane, the President promised, “This Government
will learn the lessons of Hurricane Katrina” (Bumiller, 2005b). The president also
pledged to rebuild the Gulf Coast and promised the creation of a Gulf Opportunity
Zone which would be used to provide help to the hurricane victims with their taxes,
education, healthcare and job training (Bumiller, 2005b). While speaking to the victims,
the president promised to help the hurricane evacuees by setting up “worker recovery
accounts” of up to $5,000 which they could use for educational and job training purposes
(Bumiller, 2005b).
Evidently, similar to phase 2, the strategies used can be described as more
accommodative strategies (Pang, 2006) aimed at winning over one’s audience.
The RQ3 examined what were the differences in the strategies adopted by both
governments and what role did culture play in the strategies used?
Same accusations, different strategies
The predominant image repair strategies adopted by each government to defend itself
against the accusations were different despite similar accusations. It is also observed
that the image repair strategies used by both governments changed in each phase. One
of the key differences between both the governments was the use of mortification and
corrective action by the Ma government after the initial inertia. It began to use these
strategies in phase 2 and this was evident when the government engaged in proactive
communication, in phase 3, of the crisis. Even though other strategies were used, like
shift blame-denial, defeasibility and compensation, these were used less predominantly
compared to mortification and corrective action. Benoit (2004) argued that a firm
commitment to correct a problem is an important component in image repair. Corrective
action, when combined with mortification, has been found to be strategies that are
effective image repair (Benoit and Drew, 1997). The Bush Administration, however, used
a diversity of strategies, ranging from the advocacy end of the continuum in Pang’s
(2006) conflict positioning conceptualization, to the accommodative end. It began
with defeasibility and bolstering in the initial phase, then moved to corrective
action-bolstering-attack the accuser-denial-defeasibility-mortification in phase 2, and
then bolstering-attack the accuser-corrective action in the third phase. In Benoit and
Henson’s (2009) analysis of President Bush’s image repair discourse on Hurricane
Katrina, defeasibility and bolstering were used together with corrective action.
However, when the US Government’s discourse is taken as a whole, defeasibility and
bolstering were more frequently used, and they were evident in all three phases (Table I).
The RQ3 examined the differences in the strategies adopted and the role culture
played in the strategies used. While we may not be able to draw direct correlations
between the dimensions and strategies, which can be achieved if quantitative tests like
experiments had been done, through this qualitative study, it is hoped we can provide
some inferences on how dimensions influenced strategies used.
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The role of culture in image repair
Uncertainty avoidance index. Uncertainty avoidance translates into the level of stress
and the desire for predictability among cultures (Naumov and Puffer, 2000). Hofstede’s
cultural dimensions indicate that Taiwan has a significantly higher UAI score compared
to the USA. According to Hofstede (2009), this implies that the Taiwanese culture seeks
rules, formality and structure (Frith and Mueller, 2003). Uncertainty avoidance requires
explicit, logical and direct information on the part of the communicator. The people
believe in the expertise of those in power. Shows of emotions in people are accepted as
tension and stress that need to be released (Frith and Mueller, 2003). People in high
UAI nations tend to show more nervous energy (Hofstede and Soeters, 2002).
What we may infer: it has been observed that in high uncertainty avoidance cultures,
the need for the existence of rules is much needed, and people tend to react unfavourably
when rules are unclear or uncertain. These cultures tend to be satisfied with the existence
of a formal structure. Taiwan’s significantly higher UAI score could have influenced Ma
and his officials to embark on a mortification campaign after they were accused of not
responding to the people’s needs, bowing to apologize to the victims and making himself
accessible to angry victims by visiting disaster sites. Even though Ma and his officials
were verbally attacked, this venting process allowed the villagers to release their anger,
and helped in the government’s bid to win the people back. It is no coincidence similar
image repair strategies, i.e. shift the blame and denial strategies taken during the onset of
the crisis before moving on to mortification and corrective action strategies, were
observed to be taken by an organization in another the high UAI nation of Japan. Toyota
first announced the recall of its cars in 2010 to fix a brake problem without admitting to
any defect (Kwan, 2010). It only admitted to brake and accelerator problems after a
massive recall of eight million cars (The Straits Times, 2010). Subsequently, its President
Akio Toyoda, made a trip to Washington to apologize to the US Congress for Toyota’s
mistakes, and said he was “deeply sorry” (BBC News, 2010).
The USA, on the contrary, has a low UAI score. Countries that score low
on uncertainty avoidance generally ignore isolated incidents as contributing
Phase Accusations
Strategies adopted by the
Ma government
Strategies adopted by the Bush
government
1 1. The governments were slow
in their response and were
not prepared for the crisis
Shift the blame, denial,
bolstering, and
minimization
Corrective action, defeasibility,
and bolstering
2 1. The governments were slow
in their response and were
not prepared for the crisis
2. The governments showed
lack of empathy and
compassion for the victims
Corrective action,
mortification, shift the
blame, denial, and
defeasibility
Defeasibility, compensation,
bolstering, attacking the
accuser, mortification,
corrective action, and denial
3 1. The governments were slow
in their response and were
not prepared for the crisis
2. The governments showed
lack of empathy and
compassion for the victims
Mortification, corrective
action, denial, defeasibility
Bolstering, defeasibility,
attacking the accuser, and
compensation
Table I.
Strategies used in relation
to the accusations
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to a crisis (Taylor, 2000). Low uncertainty avoidance cultures are characterized by the
implementation of rules, only when required.
What we may infer: this could be the reason why the Bush Administration appeared
less forthcoming in pursuing a consistent and coordinated mortification-corrective
action strategy like Taiwan, as uncertainty is tolerated in such cultures (Naumov and
Puffer, 2000). Instead, it embarked on six different strategies to deal with its situation:
denial to defend accusations that it did not care about the African Americans; attack
the accuser to describe the finger-pointing that was going on; defeasibility to explain the
lack of information it had; bolstering to galvanize the American people to rise from the
setback; corrective action to deal with the increasingly dire situation; and mortification
to explain how relief efforts were less than efficient.
Power distance index. Countries with high power distance point to a latent conflict
between individuals and organizations that have prestige and resources and those who
feel powerless. While the powerless accept their position in society, they are not very
forgiving when the powerful make mistakes (Taylor, 2000). In high PDI nations,
dependence on more powerful people is a basic need. People expect their leaders to lead
autocratically and make decisions (Hofstede, 1983/1998).
What we may infer: the high PDI environment in Taiwan could have played a role
in influencing the Ma government to pursue mortification, the most accommodating
strategy, to reduce this gap. Dependency is also an element of hierarchical
relationships between and among people in high PDI nations (Frith and Mueller, 2003).
Taiwan’s higher PDI score than average Asian countries could have been a predictor
of the people’s adverse emotional response to strategies Ma used in phase one. Shifting
the blame to the villagers for not evacuating was a bad strategy because it ignored
this element of dependency in the hierarchical relationship. This was manifested
in the accusations that Ma failed to exercise his responsibility as commander-in-chief.
By shifting the blame to the villagers, Ma ignited the latent conflict between the
“powerless” people and the powerful government. Rodrigues (1990) argued that in this
context, a directive leadership style would be most effective in societies with high
power distance, uncertainty avoidance and collectivism.
For countries with a low PDI like the USA, there is a lower tendency to accept
inequalities in their position in society. The USA’s low PDI could have caused the
accusation on the government’s lack of compassion to morph into a racial discrimination
charge, the basest of accusations.
What we may infer: a study conducted by Taylor (2000) of the Coca Cola scare in the
European Union bore similarities to Hurricane Katrina. In 1999, school children in
Belgium fell ill after consuming Coca Cola. The Belgium Government ordered an
immediate recall and ban of all Coca Cola bottles. Spain and France followed. However,
countries like Denmark, Norway and Sweden did not take any such precautionary
measures. Taylor (2000) argued that nations that scored high on both the UAI and the
PDI indexes showed a lower tolerance for the crisis compared to those with a lower
UAI and PDI scores. Thus, countries like Sweden, Denmark and Norway, which had
lower UAI and PDI than Belgium, Spain and France, watched and waited for more
evidence on the crisis before responding. These countries had similar UAI and PDI
scores to the USA.
During a crisis, the two dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and power distance
are believed to affect the way the organization acts during the crisis. For instance,
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a low uncertainty avoidance organization will tend to ignore isolated incidents as
constituting the crisis and may therefore take minimal action to rectify the situation or
even communicate to publics about the situation. Similarly, a low power distance
organization may not see the importance in communicating with the local government
about a troublesome situation (Taylor, 2000). For countries with high power distance
and uncertainty avoidance, organizations may have to take an entirely different
approach. They are most likely to communicate immediately with their governments
during a crisis to garner maximum support. These cultures are not tolerant of ambiguity
and risks and may take all the necessary actions to rectify the situation.
What was interesting from these two crises was that regardless of a country’s PDI,
the notion of power distance did not prohibit the less powerful to question the more
powerful. The questions by the Taiwanese were equally vociferous than those from the
USA. Perhaps, when audiences are driven to desperation as in a crisis, questions would
come fast and fiery, regardless of power distance. How organizations, or the more
powerful, respond would depend on the nature and status of PDI.
Despite pursuing a systematic mortification strategy, the Ma government’s image
repair efforts still ended in failure. Poll results published on 22 August showed that more
than 70 percent of respondents were not satisfied with the government’s performance in
dealing with the aftermath of Typhoon Morakot. More than 70 percent also disagreed
with Premier Liu’s claim that the government’s rescue and relief efforts were faster than
Former President Lee Teng-Hui’s after the 921 Earthquake on 21 September 1999
(Loa, 2009). Perhaps, Meng’s (2010) argument that in a non-Western setting, if an
organization had paid more attention to victim-oriented strategies, perception of the
crisis handling would have been better.
This could be because mortification, although the most accommodating of all image
repair strategies, would not always be the silver bullet that would salvage a situation if
from the onset of the accusations, the wrong set of strategies were used. Similarly,
Bush Administration image repair efforts did not seem to have created much of an
impact with newspaper columnists continuing to question his leadership abilities
throughout the crisis period. Benoit and Henson (2009) argued that only 40 percent of
the public approved of how the President managed the crisis.
Even though natural disasters belongs to the low attribution cluster in Coombs’
(2008a, b) typology in the situational crisis communication theory, inertia and inaction
on the part of the government can lead citizens to change the attribution from low to
high. The use of wrong strategies to assuage looming anger would tip the attribution
scale further off the culpability charts.
Referring to studies on stealing thunder, Arpan and Pompper (2003) stated that in the
framework of crisis communication, stealing thunder is an admission of a weakness
(usually a mistake or failure) before that weakness is announced by another party. It is
said that stealing thunder is useful in courtrooms, especially when a defendant’s
weakness is apparent and known to the opponent. Tests suggested that the stealing
thunder strategy can result in favourable jury verdicts, higher credibility ratings for the
defendant, lower perceptions of crime severity, greater sympathy for the defendant,
weaker perceptions of the defendant’s guilt (Arpan and Pompper, 2003). Applying this
strategy here, both Ma and Bush administrations would probably have a higher success
in winning over the citizens in their image repair efforts if they had taken a strong
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mortification strategy from the onset of the accusations since in a crisis belonged to the
low attribution category.
The truism remains: one may not have started the fire, but if one has the
responsibility of dousing the fire but did not, then one is held responsible. In this case,
the responsible party often tends to be the organization or the government.
The RQ4 examined what could practitioners learn about the role of culture in an
international setting?
Need to understand local cultures to communicate effectively
Research into the role of culture in the practice of public relations reveals a great
amount of ethnocentrism, perceiving one culture to be superior to another culture
(Vasquez and Taylor, 2000).
The premise of this study is that there is no superior culture, that different cultures
work differently, and there is no one-size-fits-all, or a prescriptive approach. Using
power distance as an illustration, Hofstede (1983) found that in nations with high PDI,
subordinates generally do not want to participate in decision making, deferring it to
leaders to decide and lead autocratically. Practitioners who are transplanted to such
surroundings from a low PDI nation will want to be more assertive in relating
with local staff even if the organizational culture, like that of an MNC, may be one
with a lower PDI. The practitioner in an MNC, tasked to maintain and manage
communication and relationships between different societies and varied cultures
(Sriramesh and Takasaki, 1999), has to have a firm grip on the local culture to be able
to perform in the new role. Using insights from branding literature where descriptors
are ascribed to brand characteristic in different cultures, an international practitioner
may surmise that in a high UAI and low PDI culture, a friendly approach towards the
local staff may be relevant. In a high PDI culture, one may want to accentuate the
prestige factor from where one came from. In a high UAI culture, trustworthiness is
often appreciated (Crocus, 2004, in De Mooij, 2010).
Beside uncertainty avoidance, the practice of communication across cultures may be
underpinned by other cultural factors. In China, for instance, face is an important
cultural factor (Ye and Pang, n.d.). As the Chinese maxim illustrates, “the ugly things in
our family should never go public”, the Chinese people would attempt to save face for
their organizations whenever possible. “Losing face” tantamount to public humiliation.
Thus, in a crisis, keeping dishonourable matters covered up is a common strategy used
to “save face”. The other cultural factor is high uncertainty avoidance. Chinese tend to
“keep their mouths shut” since they believe that “trouble is born out of the words you
speak”. Thus, practitioners who find themselves in sensitive situations such as crises
can expect Chinese organizations to decline to communicate or to divert attention
(Yu and Wen, 2003). They should also be sensitive to the cultural practice that during a
crisis, if mortification is not offered, corrective action is the pseudo-mortification
(Cai et al., 2009) as it is often the attempt of the organization to save face. The offended
party should thus give face to this unspoken gesture because that would be counted as
cordial. A persistent pressure for the offending party to apologize may be regarded
disapprovingly as “too pushy.”
So what do all these mean for the practitioner? First, any practitioner operating in
an international setting, in addition to determining effective modes of communication,
would want to also study cultural elements and symbols to avoid making blunders.
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In the circuit of culture model posited by du Gay and colleagues, one would be better
placed to understand practice if one understood how social meanings are produced and
reproduced (Gaither and Curtin, 2008). As Taylor (2000) argued and as this study
illustrates, PDI and UAI are useful indicators to understand what strategies to use.
Second, one practical way of immersing in another culture is to manage ethnocentrism.
The human tendency is to sub-consciously regard one culture more superior than
another. Efforts have to be made to minimize that, especially one is on short-term
assignments in another culture where time is not on one’s side to fully understand the
culture. Third, work with and through organizations with international influence that
encourage international collaborations. Diaz et al. (2009) found that practitioners with
an organic organizational culture (loose chain of command) and a long-term orientation
of national culture are better placed to engage in international assignments than
a practitioner with a mechanistic organizational culture (hierarchical command) and a
short-term orientation of national culture.
Conclusion
This study has examined the image repair strategies used in both Asian and Western
settings to understand how these cultures communicate during crisis. It is interesting
to observe the differences in image repair strategies used by both the Ma and Bush
governments, despite the same accusations, crisis type, scale of disaster, and external
locus of control of the disaster. Both the Ma and Bush administrations adopted image
repair strategies when accusations were first hurled at them. The wrong usage of
strategies initially probably caused the natural crisis that each government faced to
transform into a political crisis. The Ma government’s image repair efforts were
underpinned by mortification and corrective action campaign. The USA, however, did
not pursue a mortification campaign, but used a mixed bag of strategies characterized
by frequent usage of defeasibility and bolstering. From Hofstede’s (2009) cultural
dimensions, we inferred why Taiwan pursued a mortification strategy, given its high
UAI and PDI scores. On the contrary, the USA, with a lower UAI and PDI scores, we
inferred it pursued a different strategy. We infer that culture could play a role in the
choice of image repair strategies adopted by governments, in this case, one Asian and
one Western. We also infer that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions can provide the basis to
explain the failure of both governments’ image repair strategies.
A limitation of the study is that it depends on news reports, instead of news releases
and speeches, for analysis. However, given the rapidity and volatility in the unfolding
drama of each of the two crises, many of the comments made were to the media and not
in prepared speeches. It is a limitation we accept. Our intention was not just to capture
the rapidly unfolding communication between the governments and their publics as
enumerated in documents of public record, we submit that the ongoing public
discourse would reflect, to a large extent, an accurate, present and fair reading of the
reality. Even with the inherent methodological limitations, these limitations should not
invalidate our findings. Another limitation is our inability to draw direct correlations
between the cultural dimensions and the strategies used. It was not our intention to
“test” for how dimensions correlated with strategies. Future study can explore such
correlations. Our present study is a rhetorical/textual analysis, following in the
tradition of image repair studies. Even though we could not present correlations which
can only be achieved through quantitative approaches, through our qualitative study,
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we adopt a more modest approach in this exploratory study by making inferences on
how dimensions influenced strategies used.
The image repair strategies are used when the crisis leads to a loss of face. When
face is threatened, face works is used to repair image, argued Benoit and Pang (2008).
Face, image, and reputation are important because as a society, we pride ourselves on,
and value those who enact tolerance, and sensitivity, to the feelings and traditions
of others (Benoit, 2004). The work is cut out for image repair theorists to further
understand how contextual factors like culture are related to rhetoric. In a crisis, it is
not what is spoken – it is how it is spoken.
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